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THE INCARNATION AS ACTION COMPOSITE
Katherin A. Rogers
The Council of Chalcedon insisted that God Incarnate is one person with two 
natures, one divine and one human. Recently critics have rightly argued that 
God Incarnate cannot be a composite person. In the present paper I defend a 
new composite theory using the analogy of a boy playing a video game. The 
analogy suggests that the Incarnation is God doing something. The Incarna-
tion is what I label an “action composite” and is a state of affairs, constituted 
by one divine person assuming human nature. This solves a number of puz-
zles, conforms to Chalcedon, and is logically and metaphysically consistent.
I. Introduction
Christian tradition, established at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, insists 
that some things must be said concerning the Incarnation and some things 
must not be said. And some philosophers have argued that what the tradi-
tion says must be said, cannot be said coherently. Chalcedon insisted that 
God Incarnate is one person with two natures, one divine and one human, 
the latter consisting of a human soul and body. One way of trying to 
render this coherent is to portray the Incarnation as a sort of composite—
the Word plus the assumed human nature. But this composite theory has 
recently come under attack.1 The criticism is aimed at attempts to see God 
Incarnate as a composite person. But the person who is the Word—though 
He has two natures when Incarnate—cannot possibly be a composite 
person. Here I defend a new composite theory using the analogy of a boy 
playing a video game. The analogy suggests a way of thinking about the 
Incarnation as what I will label an “action composite” which conforms to 
Chalcedon and is logically and metaphysically consistent. 
Chalcedon describes the Incarnation this way: 
[W]e all with one voice teach the confession of one and the same Son, our 
Lord Jesus Christ: the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the 
same truly God and truly man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial 
with the Father as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with 
us as regards his humanity; like us in all respects except for sin; begotten 
before the ages from the Father as regards his divinity, and in the last days 
1Robin Le Poidevin, “Identity and the Composite Christ; An Incarnational Dilemma,” 
Religious Studies 45 (2009), 167–186; Thomas Senor, “The Compositional Account of the 
Incarnation,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), 52–71.
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the same for us and for our salvation from Mary, the virgin God-bearer as 
regards his humanity; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, 
acknowledged in two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no 
division, no separation; at no point was the difference between the natures 
taken away through the union, but rather the property of both natures is 
preserved and comes together into a single person and a single subsistent 
being; he is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same 
only-begotten Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ.2
How could a single person have a divine and a human nature? Don’t 
humanity and divinity possess opposing properties? A standard move 
is to attribute some properties to Christ as divine and some as human.3 
So Christ is x qua God, but not-x, qua man. And one way to elaborate is 
to propose that God Incarnate is (something like) a composite. Call the 
Second Person of the Trinity, thought of as temporally (quoad nos) or caus-
ally or logically preceding the Incarnation, “W” for Word. W assumes 
human nature by “adding” on to Himself a human body and soul. Call 
the composite of the Word assuming the human soul and body, the Word 
Incarnate or WI. The composite, WI, consists of (at least) two concrete par-
ticulars, W and the organic unity of the human soul and body. Let H stand 
for this organic unity.4 
In many cases of composites there is nothing puzzling in saying, “this 
part is x, and this part is not-x.” A ball may be half white and half black. 
Sometimes we say of a composite whole that it is x because a part of it is x. 
An apple is “red” even though the flesh is white. Can we solve the puzzle 
about opposing properties in WI by appealing to its composite status? 
So we might say that the divine part is omniscient and the human part 
not-omniscient. But there is only one person in WI, and critics argue that 
the composite proposal fails to do justice to Chalcedon. Both critics and 
defenders have tended to appeal to examples drawn from material com-
posites in setting out and criticizing the theory. I propose that examining a 
different sort of composite, an action composite, provides a better (though 
very distant) analogy for the Incarnation, one which is not susceptible to 
the recent criticisms. 
II. A Video Game Analogy
The composite is Nick Playing (NP), a boy playing a video game.5 Nick 
(N), the actual boy sitting in front of the screen, is analogous to W. He 
is playing a character—a moving human-shaped image on the screen—
which we can call “Nick’s Character” (NC). NC is analogous to H, the 
2Available at http://www.piar.hu/councils/ecum04.htm.
3See the letter of Pope Leo the Great which is attached as an addendum to the Council’s 
statement. Latin text can be found in the Patrologia Latina Cursus Completus Vol. 54, 755–782.
4The Christian tradition insists on the union of soul and body in the human person, so 
best to consider soul and body one thing.
5I proposed this in “Incarnation” in Christian Philosophical Theology, ed. Charles Taliaferro 
and Chad Meister (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 95–107.
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human body and soul of WI. Nick’s activity of “playing” is analogous to 
the divine act of “assuming.” Nick’s game is a First Person Player game 
where the player sees the action in the first person, for example seeing 
only his own virtual arms and hands and (occasionally) feet and legs. If 
there are other players, they see the character from a third person perspec-
tive as a whole figure. NP, then, is N playing NC, and is analogous to WI.
Is NP just an updated version of JM, Jim Marionetting (if that is the 
word I want)? Not at all. As I defend the video game analogy, I will point 
out multiple ways in which NP is helpful where JM is not. To my knowl-
edge, our predecessors did not adopt anything like a JM analogy, and it 
will be easy to see why.6 There is one obvious difference that it will be well 
to mention here at the beginning. Jim’s marionette is a three-dimensional 
object in our physical world. NC exists in what may be thought of as a 
different world, Nick’s Game World (NGW). NGW is an intelligently de-
signed system which is constituted by a set of mutually consistent rules, 
different from the natural laws which govern our physical universe, and 
different from those governing other video games. NGW is not entirely 
self-contained, in that it can be accessed from outside, but only by beings 
who exist on the same plane and with much of the same knowledge and 
many of the same abilities as the makers of the game. NGW does exist 
within our physical world, but the “objects” in it, the characters, the trees, 
the weaponry, are two-dimensional. Splendid as NGW may be, it is in-
comparably less rich—less complex, less detailed, less full of being—than 
our physical world. So NGW is a created world in which its makers can 
act, but which has a “thinner” sort of existence than its makers and the 
world they inhabit. In thinking about the Incarnation, NGW serves as an 
analogy for our physical world. NP can act in NGW as NC, and WI can 
act in the physical world as H. The stage “world” of the marionette is 
just a part of our three-dimensional world. So NGW makes a much better 
analogy than the puppet stage for our physical world in relationship to 
God, and NP makes a better analogy than JM.
Before developing the analogy, two preliminary points: First, it might be 
objected that NP is not sufficiently unified to count as a composite whole. 
But mereologists have achieved no consensus on how much of what sort of 
unity—if any—it takes to be one being. I do not propose any overarching 
mereological theories, but rather say just enough to motivate my analogy 
and defend my composite theory. My guiding principle is that any mereo-
logical claim that entails the falsehood of the Chalcedonian statement is to 
be rejected. Assuming Chalcedonian Christology, something which is one 
in terms of being a person can have two radically different and separate 
natures. NP has a sort of unity, to be discussed below, and for purposes of 
the analogy, it should prove sufficient. Secondly, NP—Nick playing NC—
6Richard Cross, the author of The Metaphysics of the Incarnation (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002) in correspondence supports my impression that the Medievals, at least, did 
not propose the puppet analogy.
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is better labeled a state of affairs than a person or an object. If the analogy 
is apt, this suggests that the Incarnation is properly thought of as (or as 
something like) a state of affairs. So if the Incarnation is to be thought of 
as a composite, it is not a composite person or a composite object. It is a 
composite state of affairs composed of the concrete particulars W and H, 
and also the features they exhibit, and the relations among them. 
The analogy suggests at least six important points which contemporary 
literature on the metaphysics of the Incarnation often fails to appreciate.7 
First, the analogy appeals to a composite involving a person, which is 
useful in that the Chalcedonian issue is whether or not a single person can 
be the main constituent of a composite with two natures.8 Secondly, the 
divine and human natures, dimly reflected in the actual boy and the video 
game character, occupy different “orders” of being. N is far less limited 
than NC, which exists only as the character played by N and so is utterly 
dependent on N. By “utterly dependent” I mean more than that NC could 
not be part of NP without N and that NC could not be doing what it is 
doing if it were not part of NP. NC is a first-person character and so would 
not exist at all if it were not part of NP. In this, NC is quite unlike N, who 
exists whether playing or not. Thus the analogy (distantly) mirrors the 
classical theism which undergirds Chalcedon; there is a radical difference 
in the ontological status of God and the human being. God is the abso-
lute Existent on which all else depends, such that creatures have a “thin” 
and reflected sort of being. Those who eschew that language can still ap-
preciate the radical difference between God, the source of all, Who keeps 
everything that is not Himself in being from moment to moment, and the 
creature which exists in absolute dependence on the Creator. Here we see 
one reason why JM fails as an analogy. M, the marionette, exists as a sepa-
rate, three-dimensional object in the physical world just the same way that 
J, the man, does. The marionette exists in the same way even when it sits 
on the shelf and no one is using it. M is not utterly dependent on J, and the 
relationship between J and M does not point towards existence in different 
orders of being. But the two-dimensionality and the utter dependence of 
NC on N suggest the radical ontological separation of God and man. 
The ontological distance is helpful in seeing how two things can be one. 
Two things occupying the same “order of being” must be distinguished 
within that same order, and thus their “twoness” seems less amenable to 
allowing the sort of interrelationship which the Incarnation suggests. If we 
posit two boys playing video games, and then propose that the two boys are 
7Some of the following points are mentioned briefly in my “An Anselmian Defense of the 
Incarnation” in Debating Christian Theism, ed. Chad Meister, J. P. Moreland, and Khaldoun 
Swies, forthcoming from Oxford University Press
8The council’s term was the Greek hypostasis, translated as persona in Latin. The term con-
notes something a bit thinner, especially in terms of psychology, than does the contemporary 
use of “person.” For the meaning of “hypostasis” in the Chalcedonian context see Brian E. 
Daley, SJ, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’: Late Patristic Models for the Personal Unity of 
Christ” in The Incarnation, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Danial Kendall, SJ, and Gerald O’Collins, SJ 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 164–196.
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really one being, we must reconcile the unity with whatever individuated 
the two. Nick and his friend DJ are each constituted by the organic unity 
of a human soul and body. What grounds their being individuals distinct 
from one another is something about (or present in or attached to) their 
each being a human soul and body. If we say that they are somehow really 
one Nick-DJ being, we need to show how the ordinarily-individuating- 
something is inoperant in this case. And the same for JM. With two obvi-
ously discreet “parts” of the same order of being—two physical objects—
it is difficult to see how JM could achieve the sort of unity required for an 
apt analogy for WI. (More on this below.)9 In NP as in WI we do not have 
this difficulty. 
Thirdly, based on the ontological distance and the dependence relation-
ship, there is a thoroughgoing causal asymmetry regarding the two par-
ticulars in WI which is reflected in NP. W is He “through Whom all things 
are made.” Classical theism holds that everything that exists, including 
H, is caused immediately by W. In NP, NC is a first-person character, so 
NC exists and does what it does only because it is being played by N. If 
W were (per impossibile) to stop causing H, H would blink out of being. 
And if N stops playing NC, NC does not exist. Again, JM fails. M does not 
depend causally upon J for its existence from moment to moment. J might 
cease to exist and M could be unaffected. 
Of course, there is an important disanalogy between N and W as 
causes. Unlike W, N must make use of all sorts of things outside himself 
and independent of his causal activity in order to play NC. The video 
game analogy can be improved if we add that N is the master of the 
game. He can turn it on and off, and can change, including adding and 
subtracting, elements in the game almost at will. But even still N must 
use all the equipment. And even if he could dispense with the physical 
equipment and exercise his mastery in the game simply by wishing, he 
would still be operating with preexistent concepts of things which exist 
independently of N. W is different. Classical theism as represented by 
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, has it that there are no concrete beings 
and no abstracta (no necessary propositions, Middle Knowledge, or what-
ever) independent of God’s nature and will. All necessary truth exists as 
an “extension” of the nature of God. All contingent things (with the pos-
sible exception of human choices) exist because they are willed to do so 
by God. God is an absolute creator. The most brilliant human “creator” is 
just rearranging what is given in the world. So N’s causal efficacy is just 
the barest reflection of W’s. Still NP succeeds in pointing out an important 
aspect of the Incarnation which is that one part of the composite is utterly 
causally dependent on the other.
9Perhaps it can be done. Ockham, apparently, held that each and every created substance 
of one kind “has the metaphysical possibility of being an ‘alien’ supposit for a created indi-
vidual substance nature of another kind.” Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 135. But the thought that Socrates might take on 
cow nature and be “inbovined” is deeply puzzling.
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Regarding the causal asymmetry in the parts of NP and WI, it should be 
noted that N’s behavior regarding playing the game, even if we suppose 
that N brings NC into being just by wishing, is circumscribed by the na-
ture of NC. So, for example, if NC has a virtual human body, it can run and 
shoot a gun in NGW. But NC cannot both remain NC and step out of the 
screen. It cannot be a virtual bomb to be exploded on a virtual target. N 
could replace NC with a bomb, but the bomb is not the same thing NC is. 
That means that there is some mutual causal interdependence between N 
and NC. N’s actions involving NC are somewhat limited by the nature of 
NC. The same is true of W and H in WI. The H part of WI cannot be what 
it is if it does not conform to human properties. So W’s willing is limited 
regarding H. But N’s limitations regarding NC come ultimately from out-
side of himself. Even if N brings NGW and NC into being by wishing, N 
must nonetheless wish for the instantiation of preexistent natures, proper-
ties, and relations which are not dependent upon him. God is an absolute 
creator. If He chooses to become incarnate, then He is choosing to limit 
Himself in ways which all ultimately depend upon Him. So the causal 
asymmetry in the two parts of WI is more complete than in NP. 
Fourth, the analogy underscores the important point that the Incarna-
tion is God doing something. NP is an “action composite.” It is a composite 
in that it involves at least two concrete particulars, N and NC. But it is 
unified in that NC is a necessary element in the agent N’s doing what 
he is doing. So an action composite has one particular which is an agent 
and another particular (or other particulars—we will stick with one other 
for simplicity’s sake) which are distinguishable from the agent, through 
which the agent is doing what he is doing. To clarify, take a different ac-
tion composite, the aforementioned Jim Marionetting. If Jim is asleep and 
the marionette is sitting on a shelf, there is no JM. There is no marionet-
ting going on, so no Jim Marionetting. Some mereologists hold that any 
combination of things can be an object. If so, J sleeping and M sitting on 
a shelf can together constitute an object, but this object is not JM. This ex-
tremely liberal mereology strikes me as counterintuitive, but in any case, 
it seems safe to say that, whether or not Jim asleep and the marionette on 
a shelf constitute an object, the action composite, JM, is significantly more 
unified. It is characterized by an obvious principle of unity in that it is the 
marionette’s presence as the kind of thing it is which allows Jim to engage 
in the action which is required for the being of JM. M in JM is integrally 
related to J’s activity in a way that M on a shelf is not. Though note that, 
given the point above about different orders of being, it seems right to 
say that JM is a less unified composite being than NP. J and M are of the 
same order of being. They both exist as three-dimensional beings in our 
physical universe, and M can exist without being part of JM, so M and J 
seem less unified in JM than NC and N in NP. 
If WI is (or is like) a composite, it is not a composite where the two 
parts can equally “sit there” like a cat with its tail. W engages in (in fact, 
on traditional Classical theism, He is) the pure act which keeps all things, 
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including H, in being from moment to moment. In the simple act by which 
God does all He does, W causes the existence of all there is and—a different 
aspect of that one act—assumes H. To underscore, the Incarnation is the 
Word doing something. An action composite like NP or WI is a composite 
state of affairs which comes into being due to the action of an agent. It is 
appropriate, then, to say that the agent is the main constituent of the state 
of affairs. Nick is the main constituent of Nick Playing and the Word is the 
main constituent of the Word Incarnate.
Fifth, given that NC is N’s first-person character, NC exists only when 
N is playing it and only as the first-person character N is playing. (DJ 
cannot “take over” the character. If DJ plays a first-person character it 
is DJC, not NC.) There may be other characters in the game played by 
other actual human beings, or characters that exist as non-playable char-
acters—characters which exist in the game but cannot be controlled by 
any actual human players. But NC just is the character N is playing. Talk 
of what NC would be and do were N not playing it is simply incoherent. 
So NC is unlike the marionette which can exist with or without JM. Again, 
NP is a more unified composite than JM. If NC is not part of NP, NC 
does not exist in any way at all. Analogously, H exists only as the human 
nature of WI. 
In the contemporary literature it is sometimes supposed that there is 
some separate and discreet preexistent human individual which the Word 
adds to Himself. But no. That has unacceptable consequences. However 
we develop the relevant notion of personhood, at the very least, in the con-
text of classical and medieval philosophy, it is a principle of individuality. 
If P is a person, and then loses his personhood (whatever that may mean), 
then P ceases to be the individual that he was and this would constitute 
a genuine loss. So if W were to assume a preexistent person, that would 
mean either that there are now two persons in the Incarnation, or that this 
separate individual, a “suppositum,” the ultimate subject of properties, 
was destroyed by being assumed.10 Even discussion of what status the 
human body and soul would have if they were not assumed is incoherent. 
H just is the human soul and body assumed by the Word and existing 
as part of WI. Yes, other human persons are constituted by a soul and 
body, but it does not follow that H in WI is, or even could be, a person or 
anything at all, distinct from WI.11
This leads to a sixth advantage. NC serves as a representative or expres-
sion of N in NGW. If DJ is playing a character, it is possible that from some 
perspectives—that of an onlooker in the real world who can see only the 
screen or, to adopt a fantasy hypothesis, of another character in NGW—it 
10The latter is Thomas Aquinas’s argument in ST III, q.4, art.5. 
11This point also counts against the Molinist approach in which a possible person who is 
the subject of true counterfactuals of freedom might or might not be “assumed” by the Word. 
See Thomas P. Flint, “Molinism and Incarnation,” in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. 
Ken Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 187–207. A discussion of this issue lies 
outside the scope of the present paper.
258 Faith and Philosophy
appears to be the same character as NC. But it is not. If DJ is playing a first-
person character, then, even if he is playing it in NGW, the game world 
designed and produced by Nick, DJ can play only DJC, an expression or 
representative of DJ. With the Incarnation, H is all that is perceivable to 
the human beings fortunate enough to come into physical contact with 
that part of WI. But H, as part of WI, should be understood to express or 
represent W. The thought is that our physical world is so limited that, in 
order to reach us and address us in a special way, as one of us, W enters 
into physical creation as WI. This underscores again the weakness of JM 
as an analogy. Jim and his marionette are always equally and only present 
in the physical world. There is no issue of J entering into a world with dif-
ferent properties in order to address his audience in a way which would 
otherwise be impossible. If J wants to talk to the audience face to face, he 
can just jump onto the stage. Of course, God can speak out of a burning 
bush or in all sorts of ways large and small. But if He wants to address us 
as a fellow citizen of our world, then Incarnation looks to be the move to 
make. And so the NP analogy is valuable. N as NP enters NGW through 
NC. Neat. 
III. Defending the Composite
With the analogy spelled out, we can turn to the recent criticisms of the 
composite theory to see if my suggestion of WI as an action composite can 
withstand them. (The following is not intended to criticize the arguments 
of Senor and LePoidevin insofar as they address the standard composite 
theory that holds that God Incarnate is (like) a composite object or person. 
My hope is that my proposal of a different sort of composite can avoid the 
criticisms.) Thomas Senor, explicating compositional accounts offered by 
Leftow and Stump, explains that, “The CA [compositional account] claims 
that God the Son [W in my abbreviation] is one part of the composite 
that is God Incarnate.” But then the question arises, “[I]s God the Son 
identical to God Incarnate?” He identifies God Incarnate as Jesus Christ 
and argues that if God the Son is but a proper part of Jesus Christ, then 
God the Son and Jesus Christ are not identical. And if God the Son and 
Jesus Christ are not identical, “then either Nestorianism is true and there 
are two persons in the incarnation, or God Incarnate—Jesus Christ—is 
not a person.”12 Appeal to my analogy as an action composite can avoid 
this conclusion.
There are many different senses of “identity.” Our question, the Chal-
cedonian question, has to do with personal identity. God the Son and God 
Incarnate must be numerically the same person. The question of personal 
identity is a difficult one, and there is no consensus among philosophers. 
Happily, we do not need to propose an analysis of personal identity. Taking 
the Chalcedonian statement as our framework, we need achieve only the 
modest goal of showing the bare possibility of a single being existing as 
12Senor, “Compositional Account,” 55–56.
THE INCARNATION AS ACTION COMPOSITE 259
one person having two natures. The issue is not identity understood as 
Leibnizian indiscernibility wherein x and y are said to be identical if, for 
every property F, x has F if and only if y has F. Obviously some x and some 
y may exhibit radically different properties and yet be the same person. 
Perhaps x is you at age ten, and y is you at age fifty. Perhaps x is you sit-
ting, and y is you standing. Perhaps x is you throughout your existence, 
considered in abstraction from you reading right now, and y is you con-
sidered only as you read right now. 
As I have spelled it out, WI is not a person, but a state of affairs. So W is 
not the same person as WI, since WI is not a person. W is the same person 
as W in WI, the agent who is the main constituent, and the only person, in 
WI. The analogous version of Senor’s question regarding N and NP should 
be: Is N the same person as the agent who is the main constituent of NP 
and the only person to constitute a part of NP? Call N when considered as 
part of NP, N in NP. Call Nick simpliciter, that is Nick considered in himself 
whether or not he is playing the video game, NS. NS is not identical to 
N in NP in some Leibnizian sense. NS and N in NP can exhibit different 
properties. For example, NS might or might not be playing a video game, 
whereas N in NP must be playing a video game. NS is not necessarily a 
part of something of which NC is a part, whereas N in NP is. But are NS 
and N in NP the same person? Well, it would be peculiar to say that Nick 
is no longer a person or has become a different person just because he is 
playing a video game. So the part of NP that is N is surely a person and 
the same person he was before becoming part of NP. NP is constituted by 
at least one person, then. 
Does the presence of NC in NP add a new person? No. NC is just the 
video game character played by Nick, so NC is not a person in his own 
right. This would be the case even on the fantastical hypothesis that video 
game characters can be persons. For the sake of the analogy imagine—if 
you can—that video game characters have conscious experience with 
some degree of reasoning capacity and free agency. And suppose that 
the non-playable characters are little, individual, two-dimensional per-
sons, call them digital persons or DPs. On this story, the behavior of the 
DPs, which we 3-D folks thought was simply the programming of the 
game, is symptomatic of a personal inner life. Ex hypothesi NC is not one 
of these non-playable characters. If some actual human were to try to take 
over one of these little persons and make it into a first-person playable 
character that would mean the destruction of the DP in question. There 
might be something left of the DP, but it would not be a person any longer. 
The point is this: To serve as an adequate analogy for a Chalcedonian 
Christology, even if video game characters can be persons in their own 
right, NC is not a person and never was a person. NC was never an in-
dividual substance since, by hypothesis, it exists only as the character 
played by N. In our fantasy, video game characters have consciousness 
and a will and an intellect. So NC, being a real video game character, has 
these things. But it has them only as the character being played by N. So, 
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even on our fantasy hypothesis, there is only one person involved in NP. 
If it is metaphysically possible that among the constituent parts of NP 
there is only one person, albeit a person engaged in an activity involving 
additional elements, and N in NP is the same person as NS, we have all 
we need for the analogy to succeed. It is true that, by definition, a whole 
cannot be a proper part of itself. But N can still be a proper part of NP. 
N is not NP, itself, since N is not identical to NP. Most importantly N is a 
person whereas NP is an action composite state of affairs. Still, N is the 
same person as N in NP.
If this analysis of the situation in NP is plausible, it suggests that there 
may be equivocation in the term “God Incarnate.” The term might mean 
the action composite, WI, in which case it is a state of affairs, not a person. 
W is a part of WI, in that case. Or it might mean the divine person, W in 
WI, Who is the source, the main constituent of, and only person in, the 
action composite. W simpliciter (WS) considered in Himself, in abstrac-
tion from whether or not He assumes a human nature, is not indiscernible 
in a Leibnizian sense, from W in WI. WS may or may not involve being 
incarnate, while W in WI must. WS is not necessarily part of a composite 
which also includes H, whereas W in WI is. But there is no reason to deny 
that WS is the same person as W in WI, and a proper part of WI. The Chal-
cedonian claim is that the Word Incarnate is the Word doing something. It 
is the divine person assuming a human soul and body. The Word has two 
natures, one per se, and one through the act of assuming. The human soul 
and body do not constitute a person in their own right, although other 
human individuals are constituted by a human soul and body. The Nick 
Playing analogy suggests the metaphysical possibility of such a situation. 
If the composite in question is an action composite, then Senor’s conclu-
sion—that the composite theory entails that there must be two persons in 
the Incarnation or none—does not follow.
Robin LePoidevin has recently raised similar criticisms against the 
composite theory of the Incarnation. He proposes the following argument:
(a) The pre-incarnate divine nature = the incarnate divine nature (since 
nothing intrinsic has happened to it).
(b) The pre-incarnate divine nature = the Second Person of the Trinity 
(since the three members of the Trinity exhaust its composition, and 
nothing else is divine, so only the Second person of the Trinity could 
be identical to the divine nature, given that neither the Father nor 
the Holy Ghost become incarnate).
(c) The Second Person of the Trinity = Christ (since Christ is the Son 
made man).
(d) The Second Person of the Trinity = the incarnate divine nature.
(e) Christ = the incarnate divine nature.
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However, says LePoidevin, “(e) is false, as the divine nature is only part 
of Christ.”13
But the problem with composition does not arise if we take the com-
posite in question to be the action composite WI, which “contains” only a 
single person, its main constituent, W. We can construct a valid argument 
resembling LePoidevin’s, which concludes to (e), where (e) is unproblem-
atically true. In LePoidevin’s argument the term “divine nature” is the 
term used to label the divine “part” of Christ which exists as incarnate 
and as pre-incarnate.14 This term is confusing in this context in that Father, 
Son, and Spirit share one divine nature, but “divine nature” does not refer 
to that. Here—as Premise (b) says—the term “divine nature” refers to a 
person, the Second Person of the Trinity, the one who assumes human 
nature and so could be called “incarnate” or “pre-incarnate.” 
The “=” indicates numerical identity; the terms on either side refer to 
the numerically same thing, like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.15 On my ap-
proach, the term “incarnate divine nature,” that is, the Word Incarnate, 
could mean two different things. It might refer to W in WI, the person, 
or to WI, the action composite. In order for Premise (a) to be true, we 
must take it in the former meaning. In that case (a) states that W, before 
assuming H, is numerically the same thing as W in WI. In that W and 
W in WI are the same person, that claim, W=W in WI, would be true. 
If we take “incarnate divine nature,” the Word incarnate, to refer to the 
action composite, WI, then (a) is false. W is a person and WI is a state 
of affairs, so W is not numerically the same thing as WI. Premise (b) is 
unexceptionable. It says that W = The Second Person of the Trinity. If we 
take “Christ” to label the action composite, WI, then (c) is false. It is not 
the case that W=WI. The Word assuming human nature is a state of affairs, 
not a person. But if we take “Christ,” more plausibly, to refer to the person 
who is God assuming human nature, the Son made man, then “Christ” 
refers to W in WI. Premise (c) is true if the claim is that W = W in WI since 
the Second Person of the Trinity is W, and the Son made man is W in WI. 
It is the same as the true version of Premise (a) and is uncontroversial. To 
be true, Premise (d) must take “incarnate divine nature” to be W in WI, 
and so it, too, says W=W in WI. And (e), then, says that W in WI = W in 
WI. LePoidevin’s paradox of composition disappears. God Incarnate is not 
a composite person, and Chalcedon never said He was. He is one person 
with two natures, but “with” here is entirely consistent with analyzing 
the Incarnation as the divine Word assuming human nature. (N in NP 
is a boy “with” four hands, two 3-dimensional, meat hands, and two 2- 
dimensional, digital hands.) God Incarnate is a person who brings about, 
and hence is the main constituent of, a composite state of affairs, His 
being incarnate. 
13LePoidevin, “Identity and the Composite Christ,” 178.
14Ibid.
15Ibid., 167–168.
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IV. The qua Move
A reason to employ the NP analogy, and to think of WI as an action 
composite, is that it helps make sense of the qua move in attempting to 
ascribe attributes to God Incarnate. If He is one person with two natures, 
one divine and one human, shall we say that He is, for example, both 
omniscient and limited in knowledge? But that seems contradictory. The 
traditional solution says that God Incarnate is omniscient qua divine 
and limited in knowledge qua human. But if God Incarnate is only one 
person, then it seems that it should be possible to ascribe one, and only 
one, of a pair of opposing properties to the unified being. Note that the 
properties in question are not properties ascribed to the whole of the ac-
tion composite, WI. WI is a state of affairs and states of affairs are neither 
omniscient nor limited in knowledge. Our question is about the person 
who is the main constituent of WI, whose causal activity brings WI into 
being and provides the unity in WI, that is the Word who assumes human 
nature, W in WI. 
Senor, in criticizing Leftow’s defense of the composite theory, takes him 
to task for saying that, when it comes to how to assign attributes to God 
Incarnate “there is just no uniform rule by which to figure out which part’s 
attributes will come to qualify its whole.”16 Given the nature of the com-
posite I have in mind, the issue is not how to qualify “the whole” but how 
to qualify the one person who is the main constituent of the composite. 
But a case by case approach seems right. I would add, however, that the 
cases can be sorted into three kinds. (This is probably over-simplified, 
but may be helpful as a schema which could be fruitfully qualified and 
developed.) Regarding W in WI, there are properties of a kind which can 
be had only by W, properties of a kind which can be had only by H, and 
properties which are of a kind such that both W and H have them, but in 
differing degrees (and perhaps in very different ways, depending on your 
preferred theory of how to talk and think about God). A similar taxonomy 
can be applied to properties of N in NP if we allow the science fiction 
hypothesis that video game characters have wills and intellects, so start 
with N in NP. 
There is only one person in NP, and that is N, so the question is this; 
what properties can be ascribed to N in NP and how? There are properties 
that N in NP has, only in virtue of being N. For example, N in NP can be 
holding the game controls only insofar as he is N. NC doesn’t and couldn’t 
hold the controls. Suppose that NC has just shot one of the opponent, 
non-playable characters in the game. Then N in NP has shot the character. 
(At least it is common to ask things like, “Did you shoot that soldier?” of 
the boy playing the game, and to find “Yes” an unsurprising answer.) But 
N, qua N, isn’t armed and didn’t do any shooting. NC is holding the gun. 
True, NC could not take any action, or even exist, if he were not being 
16Senor, “Compositional Account,” 66.
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played by N. Still, insofar as N in NP does any shooting, he does it qua 
NC. Given that NC expresses or represents N in the video game world, the 
locution that N acts qua NC—as or in or through NC—seems right. These 
are examples of properties that belong to N in NP either as N or as NC, 
but which could not belong to both, even in different degrees. NC cannot 
hold the game controls even a little bit, and N is unarmed except qua NC. 
Similarly with W in WI. There are properties which belong to W in 
WI only as W or only as H, but which could not belong to both, even in 
differing degrees. The Christian says that “Christ died.” If Christ is God, 
then the claim that He is mortal is at least as bizarre as the claim that Nick 
is two-dimensional. W per se cannot possibly die. W in WI can be mortal 
only because H is part of WI, and the human body can die. So W in WI is 
mortal qua H. He can weep and feel sad qua H. Or we might say that W in 
WI is omnipresent. Yes, but H is not omnipresent. H is an organic unity 
of a human soul and body, and the human body is in a place. (H, as part 
of WI, has a great deal more spatial flexibility than you and I, but still, if 
H involves a human body, it is in a place.) So W in WI is omnipresent qua 
W. In the case of N in NP holding the controls and shooting, and W in WI 
being mortal and being omnipresent, we can understand what is meant 
by ascribing the property to the person who is the main constituent of the 
whole, and it is clear which part of the action composite exhibits the prop-
erty properly ascribed to the main constituent of the whole qua that part. 
The other sort of property is the one which is possessed by the two 
parts of our action composites, WI and NP, but in differing degrees. We 
can call these “shared” properties. So N and (on our science fiction hy-
pothesis) NC both possess intellects and wills, as do W and H. Given the 
ontological distance between God and creation, there is a problem with 
how our terms “intellect” and “will” apply to W and H. One might adopt 
an analogical approach, or insist upon some underlying univocity. This 
difficulty need not affect my points here, so long as it is granted that God 
is a knower and an agent where those terms bear some positive meaning 
for us. 
These sorts of properties pose more of a problem than those where the 
property can apply to only one of the pair of parts in that a more robust 
sort of opposition is generated. With mortality, for example, it is true that 
H is mortal and W simpliciter is not, but since W doesn’t have a body at all 
and isn’t the sort of thing that might suffer a physical death, except insofar 
as He assumes H, there doesn’t seem to be much of a puzzle. But take the 
example of possessing knowledge. W has knowledge and is, in fact, om-
niscient. H, as a distinct intellect, has knowledge, too. But H’s knowledge 
is presumably limited in various ways, including by the human body’s 
part in the activity of gathering, processing, and storing information. But 
now we have the puzzle of WI, of which the main constituent is a single 
person, but which has two concrete parts where one part has unlimited 
knowledge and one part has limited knowledge. So is W in WI’s knowl-
edge limited or unlimited or—as seems contradictory—both? 
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W is the ontologically superior part of WI. W sustains the existence 
of H from moment to moment and is the cause of all that H is or does. It 
seems correct, then, to hold that the property as unlimited in W trumps 
the property as limited in H. So W in WI should be said to be, for ex-
ample, omniscient. More specifically, W in WI is omniscient qua W, but W 
in WI is not limited in knowledge at all. As an NP analogy for omniscience 
consider having internet access. N’s access to the internet trumps NC’s 
intrinsic inability to access it—the internet does not exist in the game. I 
say “intrinsic” here to allow that NC does have internet access as part of 
NP. Suppose that internet access is required to discover some information 
which will impact the actions of NC. In order to get into the secret armory, 
NC needs to push the brick above the trash barrel, let’s say. Nick can look it 
up online and NC then “knows” to push the brick. So in practice NC does 
have internet access.17 The digital persons in NGW might well be amazed 
at NC’s receiving information “from beyond.” N in NP has internet access 
qua N. He has it simpliciter, so it would be incorrect to say that N in NP 
lacks internet access qua NC. There is not any sense in which N in NP lacks 
internet access. Analogously, W in WI is omniscient, omnipotent, etc. This 
conclusion may not help us imagine what the relationship could be like 
between the divine and human intellects in WI as subjects of conscious 
experience. The fantasy that NC might have an intellect and a will is such 
a thin conceit that I don’t know that it can be developed helpfully and so 
I do not appeal to it here. However, regarding our failure to grasp WI, I 
do not suppose that we mere mortals should expect to be able to imagine 
such a thing, so I do not count this as a problem with my proposal.
The critic may hold that my conclusion about the “shared” properties 
presents the wrong picture of God Incarnate. On my analysis W in WI just 
is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, etc. But then, the critic may 
say, W in WI, the single person in question, does not fit the Chalcedonian 
description. He is not, “like us in all respects except for sin.” But what 
does “like us in all respects” mean here? It might mean that He is “truly 
human” in that He has a human soul and body. W in WI fits the descrip-
tion, in that case. Some take it to mean something like “very similar to most 
human beings in most respects” including and especially our limitations.18 
But that seems an unlikely understanding. W in WI, though possessed of 
a human soul and body, is radically different from most human beings in 
most respects. Very few of us walk on water or raise the dead at a word. 
Most of us were conceived by human mothers and fathers. For none of the 
rest of us does our human body and soul constitute a part of a unity which 
also includes a divine person. Chalcedon, in all likelihood, intended to 
make the point that there is genuine humanity in God Incarnate against 
those who would deny it. But W in WI is really quite an unusual person 
and very unlike most of us. 
17Rogers, “Incarnation,” 105–106.
18LePoidevin, “Identity and the Composite Christ,” suggests this, 170. 
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But if W in WI is not really subject to all our limitations how can He save 
us? There are many theories of atonement, and some focus on the exem-
plary nature of W in WI’s behavior or on W in WI’s sympathetic feelings. 
Adherents of these theories may insist, for example, that W in WI must 
have been truly tempted to sin—that is, He must really have wanted to 
do the wicked thing, knowing that it is wicked. And that means He must 
have believed He could do the wicked thing. If not, then He is not free and 
cannot serve as a model for us or really understand our condition.19 I do 
not see this. The property of being good is a property shared by W and 
H. My proposal is that the perfect and necessary goodness of W trumps 
the humanly limited goodness of H, and W in WI should be thought to be 
perfectly and necessarily good. The only qualification is that W in WI is 
perfectly and necessarily good qua W, but it does not follow that W in WI 
is simultaneously limited in goodness qua H. Can we make sense of the 
biblical claim that W in WI is tempted? Yes. W in WI can be “tempted” in 
that H may get hungry at a time when it would be morally inappropriate 
to eat—for example, when it would be obedience to the Devil. But W in WI 
cannot truly want to do evil, and He knows He cannot do it. The will of H 
wills in concert (however that works) with the will of W. 
But if the human will of W in WI wills in concert with the divine will 
of W, and W is necessarily good, is that human will not free? Anselm of 
Canterbury provides a plausible answer. On Anselm’s account, the core 
of freedom is aseity, from-oneself-ness. Your choices must be up to you 
in an ultimate way. Created rational persons exist with all their positive 
properties in absolute ontological dependence upon the sustaining causal 
power of God. But if you, and everything positive about you, come from 
God, how can you bear any ultimate responsibility for your choices?20 
Anselm’s answer is that sometimes God provides you with competing, 
morally significant motivations such that it is up to you which motiva-
tion to pursue. Thus, for the created person, morally significant freedom 
requires an ability to choose between genuinely open options and this 
includes an ability to sin.21 Anselm holds that the situation is different 
with God, who exists absolutely a se. He does not need the open options 
to secure the proper aseity. God, being perfect, does the best.22 Freedom 
for the divine person who is God Incarnate need not entail an ability to 
sin. Christ, according to Anselm, chooses “necessarily” from His perfect 
divine nature, and yet is free.23 The human soul and body, H, is part of WI, 
19Thomas V. Morris tries to solve the problem of Christ’s being tempted by saying that He 
cannot sin, but He doesn’t know He cannot sin; The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1986), 137–162. This seems to import too great a division between the two 
minds of Christ. 
20The qualifier “positive” is there because Anselm holds that some negative properties, 
such as “being a sinner,” do not come from God.
21Katherin Rogers, Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 73–78.
22Ibid., 183–200.
23Cur deus homo 2.10.
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and belongs to W, the only person in WI. The will of H conforms to the 
will of W, but this does not constitute one person’s will conforming to an-
other’s. The will of H is the human will of W. W’s freedom is not grounded 
in open options or the possibility of sinning, so there is no need to say that 
W in WI might sin, or that H in WI might do so. 
Does this mean that the workings of the wills of W and H are so alien 
from those of the rest of us that Christ cannot really serve as a role model 
for us? Not on the Anselmian account. The human will of Christ is not 
different in kind from the wills of other human or angelic persons. Anselm 
holds that the angels who held fast to the good when the others fell, and 
the blessed in heaven, are incapable of sin. This is because to sin one would 
have to be genuinely tempted, and these fortunate created agents can now 
see nothing to tempt them. They will only the good, but they are free, and 
are praiseworthy for their happy condition, in that they possess it “from 
themselves.” It is a consequence of their past choices which, due to the 
open options provided by God, exhibited the required aseity.24 The will of 
H is unique in that it is the human will of a divine person, not the will of 
a human person. But in that it is a human will which is free, yet must will 
only the good, it is not unique on the Anselmian view of things. 
For W in WI to serve as a role model for us, we need to try to do as He 
did. If it is hard for us, since we don’t have the unfair advantage of being 
fully God as well as fully man, well, that’s life. If the critic insists that W in 
WI must be limited in the ways we are in order to succeed in the work of 
atonement, then I respond that there is nothing in Chalcedon to ground 
that claim. Anselm, for one, proposes a theory of the atonement which 
requires that W in WI be truly God and truly man, but which does not 
attribute human limitations to W in WI. 
Is my picture of W in WI at odds with the Bible? As I have spelled it out, 
for any shared property, the divine instance trumps the human instance 
such that it is the divine instance that is properly attributed to the person 
who is the main constituent of the whole composite. W in WI is omnipo-
tent, omniscient, perfectly good, etc. But then, the critic may ask, if W in WI 
is omnipotent (for example), wouldn’t we expect more striking miracles 
than the occasional stroll on the lake or cure of this or that local individual 
that we find in the New Testament? No. We have no reason at all to expect 
more from W in WI than we get. W existed before the Incarnation (from 
our temporal perspective). So, before WI existed, W was an omnipotent, 
agent God at work in the universe. The Bible has it that, pre-incarnate, He 
produced a miracle now and again to make a point, but otherwise He let 
the system of secondary causation proceed in the usual way. He kept it all 
in being from moment to moment, but He apparently did not see the need 
to produce unusual events with any frequency. If this is how W operates, 
why suppose that He must change His mind as W in WI?25 
24De casu diaboli 6; Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 83–84.
25Rogers, “Anselmian Defense.”
THE INCARNATION AS ACTION COMPOSITE 267
But are there not biblical passages where W in WI seems to say that He 
is limited? He cannot do things and does not know things? Yes, and there 
are passages which seem to entail that W in WI cannot be limited. If, as it 
says at the beginning of John’s Gospel, W in WI is indeed the one through 
Whom “all things came to be,” and if He is truly “in the world that had 
its being through him,” it is hard to see how W in WI can be limited. Or, 
at least, it is hard to see if we are committed to the Chalcedonian claims.26 
Anybody who takes the Bible seriously grants that many passages are not 
to be understood in their more immediate and obvious sense. If we sup-
pose that the passages which suggest limitation are expressions of the H 
part of WI, we may grant that H experiences human limitations, without 
thereby concluding that W in WI does so. Again, I do not attempt to de-
scribe how the divine and human intellects and wills might interact. But 
whether or not we can imagine it, such interaction does not seem contra-
dictory, and, given the subject in question, that ought to be good enough 
to ground the possibility of God Incarnate.
V. Further Criticisms
The critic might raise a number of further points. For one thing, I have not 
spelled out the requirements for personal identity. The critic may say that 
even though N and N in NP seem to be the same person, without a theo-
retical analysis of personal identity it is doubtful whether or not the point 
about N and N in NP can be carried over to W and W in WI. I believe, 
to the contrary, that a robust theory of personal identity is unnecessary 
since, oddly enough, the personal identity of W and W in WI is actually a 
simpler matter metaphysically than the identity of N and N in NP. This is 
due to the nature of W. If, intuitively, N and N in NP seem to be the same 
person, then the possibility of W and W in WI being the same person is 
supported without our having to delve into the vexed question of human 
personal identity. 
The problem of personal identity for human beings arises because we 
change, physically and mentally, over time. There must be something 
about us which grounds an ascription of sameness over time. Candidates 
include (but are not limited to) the continuity of the physical body, the 
existence of the same immaterial substance (mind or soul) over time, the 
same ground of conscious experience over time, lasting and accessible 
memories, or some combination of the above. Different philosophers posit 
different criteria, all seem subject to difficulties, and, to date, there is no 
consensus. Though it seems an unlikely thesis, some analyses of personal 
identity might allow that N is so transformed by becoming part of NP that 
he really does cease to be the same person. But with W and W in WI there 
is no transformation.
26In the last couple of centuries kenoticism has been embraced by some. That is the view 
that the Son radically limited Himself to become a human being. This position seems at odds 
with the texts from John and constitutes a rejection of Chalcedon.
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 The God of classical theism is immutable. Though many contempo-
rary philosophers of religion express doubt about this divine attribute, it 
was generally accepted among Christian intellectuals for at least the first 
millennium and a half of Christianity. The opinion of those attending the 
Council of Chalcedon would certainly have been that God is immutable, 
and in a very strong sense. It is not that God’s nature stays the same while 
His beliefs and actions change. No. God is not subject to time and He does 
not change in any way at all.27 God does what He does and thinks what 
He thinks in one, immutable act. Since there is no change in God there is 
no need to locate some unchanging ground of continuity in an otherwise 
changing thing. So there is no problem of divine personal identity. God 
just is the person(s) He is. 
Note that this point helps address a problem about individuation. With 
NP, we may wonder what to say about a case where Nick plays for an 
hour or so, then stops playing to do his homework, then comes back to 
play for another hour. Is the second instance of Nick playing a part of or 
continuation of the first? Are there two separate states of affairs, each of 
which look to be properly labeled NP? Must we start indexing instances 
of NP to temporal points? All good questions, but happily none of them 
arises regarding the Incarnation. W is eternally and immutably W in WI. 
The critic may respond that the above point constitutes the classically 
minded theist leaping from the frying pan into the fire. If we don’t need 
to worry about God’s personal identity because He is immutable, how can 
He possibly become Incarnate? Yet again, it is Anselm who offers what I 
take to be the most successful answer to this question. Anselm is perhaps 
the first philosopher to propose, in a clear and consistent way, that God’s 
eternity entails the isotemporal theory of time.28 Isotemporalism holds 
that all of time—every moment of what we perceive as past, present, and 
future—is equally real. Divine eternity, on this theory, entails that the en-
tire spatio-temporal universe is immediately “present” to God. Thus He 
can act and interact as an agent in temporal creation in the one act which 
is His nature. It is correct to say that the Word becomes flesh when H comes 
into being, but this moment of W in WI’s conception, along with the Cru-
cifixion, the dawn of time and the end of days, is all present immediately 
to W. N and N in NP can plausibly be thought of as one and the same 
person even though N may sometimes fail to be N in NP. So much more 
so can W be thought to be the same person as W in WI given that, from 
W’s perspective, He is immutably W in WI.29 It is legitimate, then, to use 
our intuitions regarding NP to bolster claims about personal identity and 
action composition without proposing a robust theory of what human 
personal identity must consist in. 
27See, for example, St. Augustine’s Confessions 12.5.
28Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 176–183.
29This raises a problem for divine simplicity, but that is matter for another day. 
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The critic may mount a different sort of criticism and argue that NP, 
as an analogy for the Incarnation, suggests the wrong sort of relationship 
between W and H. It might be argued that N uses NC as a sort of in-
strument by means of which to play, and it is wrong to think of H as an 
instrument used by W. Does NP, as an analogy, smack of Apollinarianism, 
the position that the Incarnation consists in God as immaterial spirit or mind 
controlling a human body in place of a human soul? Chalcedon is clear 
that WI involves a human soul and body. Again, I have to admit that my 
analogy is distant at best. A closer analogy allows the hypothesis proposed 
above that we imagine video game characters possessed of intellect and 
will. Perhaps that is enough to mute the charge that my analogy suggests 
Apollinarianism. In any case, I am not sure how to develop this possible 
criticism about NC being merely an instrument. 
Senor posits (in order to later reject) the analogy of “Torso,” a human 
being who first lacks limbs and who then can have limbs attached and 
still be the same person she was before. He holds that human limbs, in 
the Torso analogy, would be more like the human soul and body assumed 
by the Word than artificial limbs would be. The artificial limbs are mere 
“instruments” and thus cannot be genuine parts of Torso. Human limbs, 
on the other hand (so to speak), are of the same type as the rest of Torso’s 
body and can be “fully integrated” into Torso.30 Senor seems to be saying 
that we should prefer an analysis of the Incarnation which allows H to 
become part of W, to be of the same type as W and fully integrated into 
W. But we do not want that at all! Chalcedon is clear that the two natures 
“undergo no confusion . . . ; at no point was the difference between the 
natures taken away through the union.” The critic might note that, in 
that quote, the ellipsis after “confusion” replaces “no change, no divi-
sion, no separation.” But saying that the two natures are not divided or 
separated means that they are together, which is not the same as being 
integrated if we take “integrated” to mean something like being blended 
or fused into a whole, which is what Senor’s analogy suggests. One of 
the main targets of Chalcedon was Eutyches, who had held that there 
are two natures before the union but one afterwards. But the Council 
emphatically denied that the two become one nature. NC cannot pos-
sibly be “integrated” into N, but I do not see that that contradicts the 
proposal that NP is a unified action composite mainly constituted by N, 
and I do not see that NC’s status is so “instrumental” as to make it inapt 
as a (distant!) analogy for H.
Perhaps what Senor is suggesting is that it is a mistake to allow that H 
is something like an instrument analogous to the marionette (M) in the ac-
tion composite JM. There the marionette was something which Jim could 
pick up or put down. Since M is what it is with or without being part of 
JM, it has a nature which can be divided and separated from the nature 
of J in JM. But that is an advantage of NP as an analogy for WI. NC does 
30Senor, “Compositional Account,” 58–59.
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not exist except as part of NP, so it cannot be divided or separated from 
N. Similarly, H exists only as part of WI. Could it be a problem that in NP 
almost all of the causal action comes from the side of N and so NC is pas-
sive in comparison, suggesting that H is passive and hence a mere object? 
But the fact is that all the causal power in WI does come from W. It does 
not follow that H is a “mere object” in some problematic way, does it? 
Is the suggestion that, if NC is something like an instrument, then, anal-
ogously, H is not a real human being? I do not see how that criticism is to 
be developed. NC is a real character in the game. If video game characters 
have intellects and wills, then so does NC. If the non-playable characters 
are actual digital persons with reason and conscious perceptions, then they 
see NC as just another one of them—except when he produces a miracle. 
When that happens, they may realize that NC is a very unusual character 
and may get some thin inkling of N, the transcendent part of NP. Similarly, 
though H is part of WI, this need not undermine the claim that H is a real 
human soul and body with a human intellect and will. Of course H per se is 
not a person. H exists only as part of WI, so H is the human soul and body 
of a person, it’s just that the person is W, the only person there is in WI.
The Council of Chalcedon held that Scripture and tradition required 
the very difficult doctrine that God “became man,” a single person with 
a divine and a human nature. The video game analogy provides one way 
of thinking about the Chalcedonian doctrine which supports the modest 
claim that it is not metaphysically impossible. Traditionally, Christian 
philosophers have held that God can do whatever is not impossible for 
a perfect and unlimited being to do. If becoming Incarnate is how God 
chooses to save us, then, bizarre as it seems, He can do it.31 
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31I thank the editor and reviewers of this journal for helpful comments.
